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S·±de 1, Rec0r ded Novem ber 28, 1984, page 1-~Ed
ward G. Lansd ale

C:

Good aftern oon.

I am Profe ssor Curre y and I am very honor ed today
not

only to have all of you here, but becau se of the
indiv idual you came to hear
who is in town as my guest .

The indiv idual spent long years in the Philip pines

and I would like for you to meet Mrs. Lansd ale,
a membe r of the ... a citize n of
the Philip pines and more recen tly, the Unite d
State s,.

Our spea,ke'l'.l this, afte'l'.' .;._

noon is Major Gener al Edwar d Gary Lansd ale, who
has been involv ed w::i:th Ameri ca 1' sintell igenc e activ ities since about 1942.

He has led an extra ordin ary life.

He becam e a close friend and confi dant of Ramon
d Magsa ysay, the hero of the
Philip pines in the years right after World War
II, when Magsa ysay was trying
to bring democ racy to that land.

Gener al Lansd ale was then Lt. Colon el or

11ajor or ... '?
L:

Lt. Colon el.

C:

Lt. Colon el Lansd ale becam e a very close friend
of Magsa ysay.

of them for many years were almos t like broth ers.

The two

When he finish ed his work

in the Philip pines , Gener al Lansd ale went to Viet
Nam and becam e an advis er
to Ngo Dihn Diem, the first Presi dent of the Repub
lic of South . Viet Nam 1 a
posit ion he maint ained for some years .

And at that point , I would like to

give you Gener al Lansd ale.
L:

Thank you

APPLAUSE
L:

••• (illeg ible) ... like to sit down back there .

What I thoug ht I 1 d do is just talk for a little
and then answe r any ques-t ions ,.
And since my wife is here as a surpr ise to me,
I have revise d ·my talk.

Usual ly

when T talk about the Philip pines or Viet Nam,
she says, I have heard it nefor e,
and bored , and she eithe r gets up or tells all
of you that you'l l get bored , too;
so I am going to talk about somet hing else and
you can ask any quest ions later
you want about Viet Nam or the Philip pines .

I want to talk about South Ameri ca
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a little.

1 1 11 tell you ... I'll tell you how tne C0mmunist party, got '

started down in Venezuela, a few stories, that is, not known ab0ut that by ,ver,y,
rt was started by an American from Philadelphia, named ~oseph

,many people.

Cornfetter C? ) and he was one of the very early American Ccnnmunists and was
asked by the Russians to go to the Lenin School in Moscow where revolutionar,±es'
are trained.

And he was in the second class there .

One of h±s, cla,ssmate~

was Ho Chi Mihn from Viet Nam and many of the other ear-ly Communists, whol5eca,me
throughout
I had gone through, a period of so many trips,
leaders a-M"O~M the world later.
out to Asia that the

u.s.

government was, getting a little worried about ,my,; .•

what I was doing in these countries and suggested I go some other place .
were getting ready to intervene in Viet Nam

7

We

tliey told me to keep strictly,

away fr-om Viet Nam and pay no attention to it and

(illegible phrase).

So I

picked South America as a good place to visit and at the time they were
blowing up the

oil rigs on Lake Maraciibo ( ) and Cuba was training saboteurs

to go in and I got in touch with the officials down in Venezuela and the Defense
Minister asked me to come down and visit.

So before going down there I, I did

-my own type of research very quickly, and checking what Americans had been down
there to Venezuela before and I discovered Standard Oil and a number of the oil
companies and D.S. Steel, Sears Roebuck and Company, quite a big American ....
but one of them was an ex-Communist from Philadelphia, Joseph Cornf;ettev, so
I invited him down to my office in the Pentagon and started talking to him and
he told -me the story of how he started the Corrmmnist Party in Venezuela after
his- training in Moscow.

The Russians, you know, wanted a revolution by the

proletariat, s0 tnei'l'.' organizers were all trained to go down to where their
factories and indust'!7ial workers, the proletariat had to be city- workers, labor,
and he had lbeen a labor leader in the D.S. early on so they sent him down to
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Caraca.s·, -Venezuela, t0 organize the proletariat there.

Tt was a very-

small proletariat , because there weren't too many workers, there.
in C0lumbia was· the next, country.

So he

There and

started working away organizing

lab0r and, and getting close to various people in .the labor movement down
there, and he had been there a couple of weeks· and they- started getting
suspicious of some of the people he was meeting and having beer with at
night and so forth and trying to talk over.

And there was a Dictat0,'r,

Gomez, in Venezuela a t the time and he suddenly started discovering that
all these people that were so nice to him and listening to him, joining in
with him and everything, were all Secret Police under Gomez, and that hewas
0n the list to be arrested and not deported, but thrown in jail and the key·
thrown away

So he started getting very worried; he was an American boy

a long way from home.
down there.

And he had only one non-Commun ist person to turn to

He didn't have any Communists to turn to, he just had these

secret agents of the Dictator, police, police-type s down there, but when he,
left Philadelphi a the family friends of his folks had said, when you are in
Caracas, our cousin is teaching at the University, Central University down
there in Cara.cas, and look him up sometime.

Maybe you two can have dinner

together 0r something, and you'll like him, and have a beer or something; he
is a nice guy.

At the moment of desperation , Cornfetter got out and looked

up this guy who was a professor at the University in Caracas, Central University,
and told him the story, and the professor said, well, T'm not a Communist.

I '·m not a. Socialist, I'm nothing, but as a friend of my folks, why, sure, I 1 11
put you up.

So he hid out at this professor's house for abQmt th'ree months,

and after some weeks of being in seclusion at this guy's· house, the professor
sta.rted inviting some of his friends over from the faculty at the Uni>versity·,
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/

and some of them were quite sympath etic to his point of view and thus

±nstead of getting ... his seed work for the party among the proleta riat, he
did
it among the intellec tuals in Venezue la in the Unive't's ity, and tlie first
Communi st party was formed there in the profess or's house.

He di::dn~t join

himself, the American professo r from Philade lphia, but the others from
the Central Univers ity joined togethe r and so .... so it wasn't the. pr0leta:t;" i::an
revoluti on at all; it was an intellec tual one.

And I had noticed that

elsewhe re in South America ; I don't think it is quite true in Central
America .

But down in South America the univers ities are the real haven

0f the h0tbed of the Commun ists and rebels and people that are cmt to cause
trouble.

When I went down some years later, Central Univers ity had a campus·

right in the middle of Caracas , a very big city, and in the morning when the
people were going to work along two of the main streets that bypassed the
campus·, on the outskir ts· of it, the students used to set up machine guns· and
fire into the traffic, be a real hazard.

And they we'l'.'e not trying to snoot

people except the people that g0 t in the way, they got shot.
trying to knock out the cars .

But they were

The main male dormitor y· on canipus• was· called

by the students , Stalingr ad, and they went out in the mor.ning and rai.s:ed tfie
Communi st flag up over the Univers ity campus.
complet ely ran it.

And while

r

And they· ran the caTl}pus•,

The¥

was there the students decided to start a,

revolut;t on in Venezue la, and they had read Mao, Mao Tse Tung, so they• went
out to do it the way Mao Tse Tung said.

Mao said, you g0 to a rem0te place

and you start your revoluti on there where it would be safe.
were all city kids, mind you, at the Univers ity.

S-o these kids·

They- didn 1 t know tne out"'

do0rs in Venezue la very well, and so they picked the Falcan Hi_lls, CSP.. 7). ,
which is a coastal area, and remote en~ugh.
except one farmhous e in that whole region.

ll

There are no people upin there,
So they waited until summer vac21,tiGm
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s0 they could start a revolution, out camping, so, boys and girls together,

L:

they went up to start the revolution .

The United Sta,tes military·, among

others·, were advisi:ng on counter.,...insurge ncy down there so, oh hoy , thi\s is- an
insurgency all of a sudden .

They were advising the Venezuel ean Army and Air

Force how· to go in and put downfue insurgency .

So when I got down there to

look into the bombing of the rigs on Lake Maracaibo and see what was going
on, r- saw this grand show of military . .. artillery booming away, aircraft
going over and bombing, and these were empty hills .

They looked like Arizona

and New· :Mexico or parts of southern California , dry hills up there, and when
I went down to ask . .. is the enemy up there; is he shooting at yoff . or what ,

ycm 1·re firing at them.

They hadn ' t

seen the enemy at all and, .. 3-man patrol,

national guard , the national guard down there is the only regular military in
Venezuela, and they are sort of a combination of military police, state police,
park service, county agents, and so forth.

They are very close. to the people.

And they were coming down out of the hills and I went over to talk to them,
and they were looking with great astonishment at this great military display
out there, and they were sending troops up in the hills and ever ything ~
said, well, the Communists aren't there.
farmhouse.

They are all over at so- and

They
~

so,, s

They got up in there and they camped out overnight and were going

to start their revolution . .. until their canteens were all empty and they ran
out of water to drink , nothing to wash their teeth in the morning, no water
fo !t' coffee or anything, so they had gone to the only place where there was- a
well in the whole Falca,n Hills C'? ) was this farmhouse and they- were sta,ying
there and w:h E! re ~they', had been was getting bombed, now they can't g0 bac k there
and they want to know how to come in .

And I said, well , let's go o ver and tell

these Generals over here with the ir Arnerica,n adviser s · tha t you will go ·up tlie;l;'e,

,
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take them up there, and invite the Communists to come on back and go

back to the University and you arentt going to kill them this- afternoon.
they went up and stopped the whole rebellion .

So

Tt was- very ludicrous- to me ,

But the Americans fought in Viet Nam the same way ... at ti'mes on the · tfi:tng.
But T wasn't permitted to stay in the country very long, but by that time
I had gotten enough of a lugubrious reputation to be a little bit like Lenin
and Trotsky in the old days when the Germans let them through to start the
Russian revolution when they put them on sealed box cars through Germany,
and they couldn't stick their heads out the windows even or the doors.

And

they used to let me go in countries if I promised not to stay longer ~han
five days.
days:?

Our State Department did that to me.

And Tasked them, why five

Well , it seems it takes longer to start a revolution than five days,

and T couldn't stay longer ... long enough to start a revolution.

I said, I've

never started a revolution in my life, and they thought that I s what I was·
going to do, I guess.

So I .. . I had a vacation from insurgency and guerilla

warfare and so on in the Far East.

But I'm just going to talk a little and

open it up for any questions, either about that or about Asia or about Viet
Nam, the Philippines ..•

Q:

On the Philippines.

I was kind of interested in your thoughts on what

position the United States should take vis a vis the Marcos regime in case of
a pepular uprising by the Filipino people.
L:

Well, first of all , I don't think there is going to be an uprising,

My- w±fe (illegible phrase). she would come up here and beat me up.
to be very c areful in how we handle the Filipino people.
with their pride.

We have got

They are very sensitive

They love the United States and love Americans, but d o n 1 t

want anybody to say that, except themselves,

Tf an American says- that, they

w:ill deny it, and they will have big parades out in front of the Embassy,
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Americans Go Home, and so forth, and then the next day they· wi l l be in

trying to get exit visas and get visas to the United Sti'J,tes, to c ome over here,
.•. My wife used to work at the Embassy and watch thes:e parades-, and they we~e
the same people that leave off the lines trying to get visas to come te, the
United States, and go out and join the parade, you know, Yankee Go Home, and
they would carry signs· around and so forth.

But this to them is heaven, here

in the United States, and they would like to get here.

They, .. they share tfie

same ethics that we do, the same principles and dreams that we believe in ,
ideals, including democracy.
offering one way out.
all.

And they don't have it now·.

The Communists· are

I don't think that t:'.hey will want to go with them at

I don't think they will go, follow them, but it is the only open way·

to go, other than going along with Marcos, so a lot of the people are uneasy·
in themselves on what to do next.

When something happens the:r;e , I think itts

going to be when something happens to Marcos himself.

Physical ailments o r

debilitation or something, he will have to sit down and it's going to be
an "iffy"

sequence then.

But if the United States steps in to do something,

we are going to be making mistakes there with the people and we can 1't win •..
we 1·d jo;i:n whoever it would be against at that time, shoWc an open enmity·, wnicli
wouldn •· t be a true one but it would be evident there and it would be wrong so 1
we have got a very ticklish row to hoe.

The Soviets are in there nc,w-. .. they

have got a lot of military attaches, they have got a got of KGB pe~ple with.
thei'I'.' Embassy in there.

They have learned the local language.

They ar:e getting

all around the country, getting to meet people and go with them, but
think they have made that much of a headway with them at all.

r

don~t

I think that the;

loyalties:, the deep-down feeling of the Filipino people, are s ·till towa,rds· the.
United States and what they have with us.

But they are coming up to a ver:y·
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tragic moment when something happens to Marcos.

And it's too bad that

he hasn 1' t prepared his country better for his demise tha,n he has·.
he has- a scheme but I'

Q:

know that it is good.

I wonder if you

He thinks·

Yeah ?

phrase) techniques, psychological techniques,

that were used in counter-insurgency (illegible phrase).
L:

Yeah.

those days.

Incidentally we called almost everything that we did Psy war in
And I used to get kidded every place, you know:, you and your

God damned Psy War they would tell me, you know.

But the Communists fought

using psychological operations as the ... psychological political operations·
is their main activity and in order to fight them, fight them successfully,
you had to go back along the same veins to do that.

We . . • do anything that

would force the enemy troops and groups to do certain things, and either ge
the wrong places or be misdirected and so forth..
Colonel Valeriano.

I introduced

loud hailers

One of them was my f r:i;end,

from the Navy, beach maste'l'.'s in

fhe-.,, World War II, . I got some old surplus ones, had them carry it up in a
liaison aircraft, and get out and talk with the enemy troops when he was·
fighting a Huks' squadron and yell at them.

We'd get very good intelligence

on them, so he would go up and yell at them, call several of them by· name
so he could spot them out in the . . . they'd be running from his troops, and
calling several of them by name, and said well, the next time you a'l'.'e here,
we are going to handle it a little different and then Goodbye to our friends
in the ranks·, I'm sorry I can ' t call you by name.

But they would get to a

rest area, the enemy getting away from his troops and look for his friend i .n
their ranks and shoot two or three of the Huks there.

And he didn't have a

friend in their ranks, but he had enough. information on them ,

That was a very

11

live ... of doing ... ;I:; 1J:?emef9b.e;q ;i:,n the elect.ions, of 1,51_ , w.e. got . tne . A,mny· in to '

s ·ide 1, Recorded Novemner 28, 1984, page 9---Edward G , Lansdale

L:

pretect the elections and bring the people and government cl0ser together ,

And the Conrrnunists· had a mov ement before. that in the previous· elections· o
boycotting them, and some of the intelligenc e , Filipino intelligenc e people,
found an
agitprop cell of the Conrrnunists in the Manila area, and let me know aoout. · ±t.
And we introduced Boycott the Elections propaganda into them in leaflets-,
which they started distributin g and the Politburo bawled this· agitprop cell
out for doing something not authorized.

But meanwhile they had all adopted

it, it had been a familiar slogan from two years before, so they all went in
and adopted it:

Boycott the Elections because it would be dishonest,

we ·made a very honest election.

well,

The people recognized its honesty , and the

people against the administrat ion all won in the election, and it became very
0fo.rious that the Communists had been wrong in wanting to boycott it,
we said, well, get your leaders on your side.

So then

So that pride about the elections·

and so forth, they must be the same way about what they want you to do in the
future and so forth.

Do you still trust them ?

Well, a lot didntt and we had

gotten a lot of. people over to join our side because of it.
things like that.

We did a lot of

we ... I think the biggest thing wasn•t propa ganda as such,

but we started a program to get land to the landless over there, which is· a
big Communist slogan, at the time. Many of the Communist recruits and so forth
were farm kids whose parents had been in debt and paying off on family debts
and were tenant farmers, and they were paying off debts that their fathers· had ,
so it was about two or three generations ba c k that usury and so forth, and
paying off debts.

And when the Communists said, we are going to , .. everyo ne

of you is going to get some land of your own if you join us; in the beginning
was a very popular thing to do.

we got some land down in Mindanao and took.

pe0ple retiring from the Army and got the prisoners who looked all right to us,
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sent them down to Mindinao, along with the Army retirees, and we started

s0me agricultural settlements down there.
group of prisoners we took down there.

And they . • . I remember the first

One of them was a. young guy and we

had everybody aboard an LST going down to Mindinao, and I was watching tn±syoung Communist prisoner going around talking secretly to an awful · l0t of
people aboard this LST, and it looked to me as though he was organizing
something.

I told the Secretary of Defense, Magsaysay, I said, T think we'' re

making a mistake just taking this rebellion, Luzon where they ha.v e been
fighting, down to Mindinao now and this guy is going to make future tr©uhle
for us down there.

So he went and talked to him and he said, yeah , he is,

trying to line up a little bit of hard core down there.

And we got down to

Mindinac, and this is like California is to us here, is to Florida Cillegiblel
But when we got down there, the trees, fruit trees, fruit was ten times as,
big as anybody had ever seen up in Luzon.

The fish and everythj:ng were. big ~

And everybody's· expression, you know, this big and what have you , t0 sh©w
how- big everything was.

And this guy who started, and worried us·, prisone:l'.' 1

finally told him we were going to take him back to Luzon and he couldnl>t
s·tay cm there and .•. a place for him.

He looked at this and there is a little

band of local people on the landing strip that we pulled up to in the LST ~
They had a 3- piece band out there playing Welcome to Mindinao to us,, and we
got down ..• and this guy came up and he had tears in his eyes and he. begged
Mags·a ysay to please, couldn't he stay there.

He didn ~t know that i _t was for

real .•. and he said well, Magsaysay said well, take him along with us.

we

went in to where they were going to colonize in the jungle there , clea,;r a
jungle out and he was looking at the trees· a,nd everything.

He stayed on and

finally begged Magsaysay so much to stay on we left him the!r,e, · Nt,:,rd q;f tli:gs:
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thing that we were. doing spread all over Asia .

far it went.

/

I' was· su;i:;pri:sed at how·

And the British d0wn in Mai:asia ,.were having trouble apparently

with their problems there, the Communists and the people in Malasia working
with the British and either helping them or fighting against them were all
talking about what we were doing.

We called--(illegible} the Headquarters

and the Headquarter was the wonderful place we had.
STDE 2

we had a generator., .

... and one of the persons that came over was a New York Times correspondent
and he said, well, I'd like to talk to somebody that was a real dyed in the
woo l Huk1down :_-ibhere.

All I see are happy, smiling people and half of them

are Army and half of them o..ta:im they're former Huks.
hard Huk to talk to.

I'd like a real die-

So I said, well, here's one of them.

I introduced him

to this guy that we'd had real doubts about having him stay there, and he
talked to him.

And I left them alone and went on and finally this New York

Times correspondent came over and saw me and started cussing me under his·
breatfL, and I said, what's the trouble?
your propaganda agents.

He said, well, that guy is· one of

And I said ... he was a Communist, why he fought real

hard up in Central Luzon area.

And he said the way he talked to me, he was:

raving about this place and asked me to please write it up and so forth,
Well, I''m sorr-y, but he was a real hard core Communist, and he. changed
completely.

So with that, I said to Magsaysay, let's try him out.

Let's

send him back home and talk to the folks at home, to Central Luzon where he
was from.

So he went up then and talked in his home barrio to his uncles,

and then went up to where all the Huks were recruiting from and so on a,nd

(

q

telling them about this headquarter down there and he was telling stories 1 you
know, a,bout everyth;i:ng was this big and this big and so on.

It was like. some
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guy selling real estate in, I'll say California, and rea,lly amused me,

But ..• (illegible) he brought his mother down and his s·ister, and the fi:l?st
time in his family's history, he is out of debt and hets paid off,. . and he
owns· his own place now.

And the new peoples' army is trying to rec ;t;"uit

down there and isn't getting any recruits in that area at all a,nd wQnt..t
have anything to do with them.
Q:

I believe you ha,d a question, t0O,

I was going to change the scene a little bit; add a, mucfr. more tcmgli

political question.

You were the acknowledged exper,t on South Viet Nam

during the Eisenhower administration,., .discussed by ProfessoF Cur;i;'e~('l,s,
introduction; something happened when Kennedy took office, · I d~nlt kn(')W1
I don•·t understand what it was,

I wonder if you would explain it te, us·.

Acco't'ding to (illegible) when Taylor was sent, General Taylo't' was- sent t<;?l
South Viet Nam to do an appraisal of what would be needed there , you went
along as· part of the mission.

There was a power play of some ki.n d Cilleg:j_':bleL

wherein you were assigned some as:i:m.irie ~objective, defense feasibility study,

r

don't know, for building a ... wire around Viet Nam or something to stop the

insurgent.. ,to stop infiltration and this didn't sit very well with you
for obvious reasons.

It appears to me that somebody had it in for you,

p;robably,.,is that because of you:i:; background in the Eisenhower administration
O't' what, and as near as I can tell, once again from my limited access through
David Elderspan (sp.?) and other miscellaneous sources, from ... during the
Kennedy admi nistration you were essentially cut out of effective policy input.
L:

That is correct,

Q.

What happened?

L:

I don't know.

I don't know.

I should know, and I don't.

I had just

c0me back from Viet Nam, a visit there, at the end of the E.;i:s:enhower administration,
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a n d I got back to Washington a week before the inauguration of Kennedy,

And he was· inaugurated and then that first weekend after he was inaugurated ,
McNamara was the new Defense Secretary.

He called me at home on Saturday

morning and asked me to get down to the White House immediately where he
was.

And I went down·, there was a meeting there, and they-•.• Kennedy had ·-my

report in front of him, and he was ... it was in the .. ,I think it was in
the Cabinet Room ..• but he had a strange assortment of Cabinet and Assistants,
about 20 or 30 people, and one of them was the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. ·
And Kennedy said he had read my report on Viet Nam, and he said, what d0 you
think of going over there as Ambassador?

No, he said, did Dean tell you,

did Dean Rusk tell you that I'd like you to go over there as the Ambassador'?
No, he didn't, which he hadn't, hadn't mentioned at all.

And then I thought,

my gosh, the guy is asking me to go over as ... well, thank you very much,
finally, I stumbled, and I said, I'm a regular military officer and T dontt
think my place is in diplomacy.
to the

i

Charge

And that was .. later I was in Bolivia, talking

of the U.S. mission there, of the Embassy, and he had

been Dean Rusk's Assistant at that time, up in Washinqton.
·me tell you what happened after you left the White House,

And he said, let
He said Dean Rusk

told the new President that he woulLd resign as Secretary of State if Twas
appointed to go over as Ambassador.

And I said, why?

He said, well, we don 1 t

want you military types taking over and running our foreign affairs,
said, well, I had no intention

And T

(illegible phrase)

and I agree. with you, I don't want that either.
fuss· that I had no idea of doing that.

Evidently it caused a niq

And right after that thev set up a

tas-k fcrce on Viet Nam in Washinqton and McNamara, who has got a bigger eqo
than any of us, and many- of us have very__ <h{g _qnes, he had a bigger one, he

/
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came over from a meetinq with Kennedy two days later and said, they

cut 0ut the National Operations Board which (.illegible} and we 1 re so'l?t of
stuck now on how to get the different departments together on foreign policyand come to some quick decisions among themselves, and I promised Kennedythat T would show up at the next White House meeting a,nd give him tne answer
to :i_t,

A,nd he had two of us in there, and he said, T want you t<5 come up ·

in the next couple of days with the answer to what I tell the President,
and so he could go back and boast to him , what a great idea he had ,
other guy was reorga,nizing the military in the Pentagon.
have got me snowed under with work now.
so we can both give it to him.
that would do it.

The

.,

He said, Bos-8'; y0u

I said I'll come up witli. an idea

I came up with the idea of a tc:1sk_ force,

So Kennedy took the idea and he set up his first one

He asked the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gilpatrick, to
Officer
'!
and make it work. Well,,
chair it, as- long as I would be the Executive J
for Viet Nam .

we held meetings at the Pentagon and we had all the bras-sin from Sta,te and
other agencies and departments and Gilpatrick told me, said, I dontt think,
we are under such serious pressures here; you go in and chair the meeting ,
I said , no, you are the chairman; you do it,

No, y0u go.

I said 1 look the:se

guy-s are just waiting for a big fight with_me , T feel it in my bones,

So!'

went in and all the soeeches from the State Department officia,ls, what a
big bum I waS:; it started that way, not on Viet Nam at all but why I
shouldn' t o ym±xed up in it,

So the second, third meeting, when I couldn 11t

get G:j:lpatrick in, I started off the meeting, I said, now- I 1m going to
give each_ of you two minutes rebuttal on the thing; I'm going to tell you
in the beginning what I think of you .
So T tc:ild them.

I have refrained frqm that up to now .

A,nd I said, now, each of you have got two minutes to sa,y what
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you want to say and then we' 11 get on with the main fmsines•s here and

cut out all of this foolishness.
and I made some enemies· there.
up policy.

Well, those things: don't go in oig conferences,
They would say the craziest things·, making

One of them was ambassadorial rank, a very good friend of mine,

got up and he was trying to be appointed Ambassador over in Viet Nam,
was· Ambassador closeby there.

He

He got up and said, I think we should ha,ve a

two-wheel, we are going to have a two-wheel foreign policy, a_n d I s-q,id, you
mean one bicycle with two wheels? ... or two bicycles with one wheel?

And n.e ·

said, no, don't be foolish now, we ought to have a two~wheel policy,

I s·till

don•· t know what that means, but. ... imagine these are grown-up Americans.deciding the future of the country, what we fought a war about , and these are
serious discussions.

J:: couldn \·t even understand i _t ,

-me out ef this and fortunately they did,

S:o J.' sa,i.d, please get

Then when r.,,we m0ved all e;,-ver the

. , ,State was· screaming so at Defense that we moved it all over to State,
But I discovered then that I was scheminq and taking over all of the State
Department functions over in Defense in the Pentagon , which. I never did, but,
imagine people thinking that.

But I was just trying, arguing for common

sense and everything ... but some feel that the people., .receiving end of our
efforts ... and I felt very much for the Vietnamese people, then and now, so
much so that my wife in the Philippines said that the Vietnamese aren't
worth it, your worrying about them all the time, but I feel that way, and I
feel the same way about the Filipinos.

And I think that you students parti.-.

cularly, and I know that you are interested in foreign policy and foreign
affairs and some in the military service and so on, when you get to a foreign
country, which you will, start working .. ,people there expect something f!t'om
Amer-icans; the current attitudes will never show it.

They might be ver y
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anit.-American in their mobs and demonstrations and eve'.t'ything, deep

within them they have another view of the United States and of A;mericans
it means something to them.

It's not something (illegible).

sta't't work and the closer ye:m come to ideals that

we

So when ye:m ·

have· T±n the United

States , the things that we really believe in , and your work, translate
that into what you are saying to them and your own behavior
a;mazing what happens next with them .

it~s just

Yem start speaking a universal

language to them and you become very close to them and I have become like
brothers and sisters with many people around the world simply· because as
they have later confessed to me, you acted as·
Americans should.

though we always thought

And .• . . a lot of American militar-y there and so fo'l'.'th.,

but when you stand up for something and the going gets tough and you still
stand up for these things, it rings out loud and clear and it 1· s

the

strongest ·moral force that argument and psychological forces an individual
could have.

So, let me pass that along to you as something t o hang on:,:- to

and remember at a time of need in the future .

Anybody else have a question;

Q•.. . Do you believe that, in your opinion , are there a lot of (illegible)
similarities between the situation in Viet Nam and the current situation in
Centr3:J.America and (illegible). .

Do you think, as you were saying before,

that the Communists or any of these parties, their major aim is psycholegical
and political; that we are kind of over--e mphasizing the military solution
to this and we are de-emphasizing the psychological and :9olitical aspects
of the, in the conflict?
L:

Most of our solutions, we send observers from the Pentagon and the State

Department to go down and look at a situation, and sometimes a person will,
fr,0m his 0wn staff ; send people to look.

In turn, they go in with professional

/

s·ide 2, Recmcded November 28, 1984, page 17-~-Edward G. Lansdale

L:

views of Americans on the scene and again get in with. the foreign ser-

vices- and the military services.
what we went through.

And apparently· we didn"-t learn enough by

Quite a few of us· caught on in Viet Nam.

I,

r was-

surprised ·myself eventually to find people who really knew what was happening
and why· it was happening and so forth .

But the predominant forces that w1;,,rk

in the cemntry , policy-wise and something, apparently never did catch on,"
try to be ..•.. for us·.

So I hope at some point we would start tlfrnking tha,t

these are essentially political movements, aimed toward political g0a,ls-,
They use psyc ••. psychological means to help them towa,ir-ds~ that and military
'I

again as a help towards that.

When you go in just military against it , you

can never win it, unless you kill everything in sight.

The Com,muni·sts-

themselves in fighting their guerillas and insurgents· leave

a.

scorcrred earth

behind them. The Chinese, for example, up ••. when they went against Tibet,
they ... they told the people in the country to come int~ register at the
town by such and such a thing, gave them a deadline and when the people •. •
when that dealine passed, they ... the troops went out in the countryside
and just shot everything that was moving, men and animals .

The Soviets- do

the same thing.But you have got to move your own people in to fill the va,ca,nt
spots , and we, we can't fight that way, and we shouldnl•t.

we should see .

it as a political move and see what forces we can bring, including psycholog:j_~ca,l
and political forces and moral, and what military fo'l'.'ce would be understood

,,
by the people there and accepted by us.

I remember the first time in Viet Nam,

I saw artillery being used by the Vietnamese against the enemy vi'.llages-r in
1960, December 1960, at the end of the Eisenhowe't' administration ~· and

r

got ' so

mad '.I: jumped out 0f the car, . ,a Vietnamese Gener-al that I· knew·, it was nis- outf;i-t
•j

the't'e and they were sh0oting over the village, and T got him to ceq,se fire,, and
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demanded an explanation of it.

My friend there was frc,m the staff of

Ngo Dinh Diem, the President, and he was trying to calm me dovm,
you werenit supposed to cc:,me out and give orders like that.
should; give them orders to stop.

He said,

I said, ycm

You don't do that against y0ur own people.

And the Americans did the same thing, Koreans-, •. and the :Ko:l'.'eans did tfie sa;me
thing.

.
at people
.
.
Stand off with artillery and shoot:/ . And I was try-Ing t® expla,In . ·

to them, the Communists use, that's a psychol(')gical judo there, .. using.
They 1·11 go into the village and teach the pe0ple to use slit trenches- outside
thier homes or under their beds, so when the aircra;f:t or artillery come in,
everybody can get in a slit trench and have some chance of luck, · Well, ·
after they have trained the people over that, they 90 con ciut and slioot · a.n
Army convoy with rifles and so on and get the troops mad enou<?fh tfiey bring
up the artillery and shell this hostile village.

Well, thevi1lage't's are

standing there with their mouths open, you know, looking at these foreigners·,
the guerillas: hidden among them, doing that.

And the Communists· turn around,

get in your slit trenches, you know, we are going to save you.

Well, they·

only save the guys that they got in trouble, see, and if they hadn 1 t been
there, that wouldn't havh

appened.

But we oblige and fire back and I said

that the enemy was getting us to use jujitsu, as I said at the time, · but
it was our own efforts turning the people against us,

If we had sent infantry

in and braved a little fire, and went in after them to protect the people
and done it a,s.· a conscious . , . and protectors it would h,;i,v e been a very·
different result.

But we'd done it enough in Viet Nam so by 1965 when we

sent trQops, in we had a lot of hostile areas that we should never hav e had
and a lot of it was- done with American, hecause•w,e didn 1't know·,

When you · a:r;e

shot i3,t 1 y9u shoot back. , •• well 1 that's a good rule, but you s:ho<l!t back
at the guy shooting at you, not the innocent people standing next~ t~ him ,
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but we didn 11 t seem to catch on to that at all.

And I went back to Viet

Nam later on, after I had gotten out of the military and retired, a,nd I went
f>ack as m imirlis,t er ',: -rnoitr like you were a minister, but a minister in the
Foreign S'ervice helping save things

and I spent some years in Saigon trying

to help on these and similar matters·.

And I go over and have breakfast with_

Westmoreland and beg him to stop some of the things a,nd he would tell me,
you are not a general, forget that, I won't let you be one

•.. that could be a pain in the light of the situation on

Unidentified Voice:
the gr

nd.

honestly,

I don't think we could obtain much more, but I must say that very
did not have much optimism that South Viet Nam was going to •• ,

Second Unidenti 'ed Voice:

I have developed trouble in the pull back, and

ooded patch and the son of a bitches just ripped the

we are in a little

trees apart, you kno~

and no way you could ... it was just trees, it was
\

\

roots all over the place.'~ r kept (illegible) alive (illegible)., .the s-econd
year in a row I

.... So we w~e driven out of there and then the next day

\

we went out there (another voic~ Good to see you.)

I ran a charge 0n

',

that box and pulled the charge and'it blew, and very rarely when you blew

'

c~~ut?)
to tna
readv
(or were come
stopped all fire but these bastards
out,
the box they were a1-reae1.y
kept coming back and
(illegible) go up.

(illegible--lot of ba k round noise} so they had a

\
Muscatel, do you remember t,hat, there was a tank that

\

went up and he just almost, he was just starting t \ dig into the dirt, a,nd
the guy c0mes- running out of the hole, out 0f the. nia* ,~
thing on the tank and it burst into flame.

nd he throws• s~me"'

Now I' am te;i'i ±ed of ·mo'l'.' tars, or

artillery fire, I really., . • r got ,,,r wasn't worried about th

fire, were

